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 The Status of Human Rights 
Protection in Europe:  
It’s Complicated 
Jen Neller,  in conversation with Dr Sonia 
Morano-Foadi* 
The 2015 Conservative election manifesto and debates about Brexit 
have brought the status of the European human rights institutions 
and the UK’s relationship with them to the front pages; but within 
the surrounding debates, confusion has abounded. This is 
understandable, not only because of the multitude of acronyms and 
institutions with the word ‘European’ in their title, but also because 
the relationship between these institutions and their relationships 
with their Member States is convoluted and continually evolving.  
Exemplifying this, the long-term project of harmonising 
human rights protections across the region has undergone 
considerable turbulence in recent years. The entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty in 2009 paved the way for the European Union to 
accede to the European Convention of Human Rights, which would 
result in the formal coordination of the two regional human rights 
systems. However, after years of painstaking negotiations, the Court 
of Justice of the European Union published Opinion 2/13 on 18 
December 2014, finding that the Draft Accession Agreement as it 
stood was not compatible with the treaties of European Union law.1 
This brought the entire process to a standstill. It is within this 
context that our discussion of European human rights protections 
takes place.  
In the first part of this article, I provide a brief overview of the 
historical development of the two European human rights regimes. 
                                                       
* Jen Neller is a doctoral candidate at Birkbeck University of London. With thanks 
to Devin Frank for additional research.  
Dr Sonia Morano-Foadi is a Reader of Law at Oxford Brookes University. 
1 Opinion 2/13 of the Court (Full Court) of 18 December 2014 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454. 
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The relationship between them is then explored, using the case of 
Bosphorus v Ireland to illustrate the potential for disagreement and 
tension between the two courts.2 In this case on decisions of the Irish 
High Court and the Irish Supreme Court in the 1990s, the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ, now the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
reached contrary conclusions as to the human rights responsibilities 
of EU Member States when they implement European Community 
law. I then outline the accession process so far and the challenges 
presented by Opinion 2/13, explaining how the CJEU’s unwavering 
demand that the autonomy of EU law be upheld in full has presented 
a substantial stumbling block.  
In the final part of the article, I put some questions about the 
status and future development of human rights protections in Europe 
to Dr Sonia Morano-Foadi, a Reader in Law at Oxford Brookes 
University.3 In April 2016, Dr Morano-Foadi and her colleague Dr 
Stelios Andreadakis were among a select collection of experts who, 
over a year after Opinion 2/13, presented their views to the 
European Parliament on how the accession project might best be 
resumed and taken forward. 4  The recommendations that they 
presented were based on an ongoing research project that 
commenced in 2010 and involved interviewing judges from both of 
the European courts on the accession process and the future of 
human rights protections in the region.5 
                                                       
2 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm v Ireland App no 45036/98 (2006) 42 EHRR 1. 
3 The conversation published here occurred in an exchange of emails in May 2016. 
4 Sonia Morano-Foadi and Stelios Andreadakis, ‘The EU Accession to the ECHR 
after Opinion 2/13: Reflections, Solutions and the Way Forward’ (20 April 2016) 
<https://polcms.secure.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/upload/2d9afaae-36ec-49ee-
973b-6c3648c0dfd7/EP%20Hearing%20Contribution%20MoranoFoadi%20 
Andreadakis%20April%202016.pdf> accessed 22 July 2016. A full recording of 
the meeting is available from European Parliament News, ‘Committee on 
Constitutional Affairs - meeting 20/04/2016 (AM)’ 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20160414IPR23145/ 
Committee-on-Constitutional-Affairs-meeting-20042016-(AM)> accessed 22 July 
2016.  
5 British Academy, Small Research Grants scheme, SG 2011 Round, Reference 
number: SG110947. A number of additional university grants were awarded to the 
research team from 2010 to 2016 to continue topical research. 
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The Accidental Development of Parallel Systems 
The Council of Europe (CoE) and the European Union (EU) are 
entirely different organisations: they were created at different times 
and have different charters and mandates, which are presided over 
by different courts. However, as they have evolved and expanded, 
the area of overlap between them has increased, especially with 
regards to human rights and fundamental freedoms.  
Human rights were at the heart of the CoE from its inception 
in 1949,6 which was the culmination of 10 countries seeking closer 
ties with one another shortly after the Second World War. A year 
later, Member States adopted the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), a legally binding document which was to be 
presided over by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 
Today, the 47 Member States of the CoE are bound by the ECHR 
and the judgments of the ECtHR, as well as any additional ECHR 
protocols and CoE conventions that they have ratified.7 
In contrast, economic integration has been the cornerstone of 
the EU’s establishment and evolution. The roots of the union lie in 
the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community between 
six countries8 in 1952, which also established the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ, now known as the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, CJEU). The European Economic Community (EEC) was then 
born in 1958, which the UK joined in 1971. In 1993, the European 
single market was achieved and the EEC transformed into the 
European Union. Due to the focus on economic integration, the 
status of human rights within the EU has emerged in a more ad hoc 
manner than in the CoE, and has grown up as the character of EU 
                                                       
6 Article 3 of the Statue of the Council of Europe states that ‘Every member of the 
Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the 
enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms’. 
7 Other CoE conventions include: the Convention on Action against Trafficking in 
Human Beings; the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities; the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; and the European Social Charter. 
8 France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
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law has developed. In particular, the centrality of human rights is the 
result not only of treaty developments, but also of ECJ rulings.  
With the ECJ’s assertion of the primacy of Community law in 
1964, 9  national constitutional protections of fundamental rights 
became at risk of being overruled by a body that provided no 
substantial human rights guarantees. For many years, this tension 
was assuaged — but not resolved — by references by the ECJ and 
within EC treaties to the ECHR and the rulings of its court as a 
common standard. Fundamental rights first entered into the EEC 
treaties through the preamble of the Single European Act in 1986, 
and were later included more substantially in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam in 1997, facilitating greater constitutional authority for 
the EU. In case law, the ECJ has explicitly accorded ‘special 
significance’ to the ECHR since the 1991 case of ERT v DEP.10  
In 2000, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (the Charter) consolidated the rights established in the 
EEC/EU treaties, along with other rights drawn explicitly from the 
constitutional traditions of Member States, the CJEU, the ECHR and 
other international treaties. Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon of 2009 
conferred legally binding status on the Charter, and fundamental 
rights thus became fully incorporated within and central to the EU. 
However, it should be noted that the scope of the Charter is 
narrower than that of the ECHR, as it applies only to actions taken 
by the EU and its Member States in the enactment or fulfilment of 
EU legal obligations. 
It is therefore more through necessity than design that the EU 
has become a human rights body. Its corpus of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms has developed at every stage alongside and in 
confluence with the ECHR, with harmony actively pursued by both 
European courts through dialogue and reference to each other’s 
decisions.11 Indeed, former president of the CJEU Vassilios Skouris 
                                                       
9 Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v Ente Nazionale per l’Energia Elettrica (ENEL) [1964] 
ECR 1141. 
10 Case C-260/89, Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia 
Syllogon Prossopikou v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and 
Nicolaos Avdellas and others [1991] ECR I-02925. 
11 See Sonia Morano-Foadi and Stelios Andreadakis, ‘A Report on the Protection of 
Fundamental Rights in Europe: A Reflection on the Relationship between the 
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has described the ECHR as the ‘beacon that guides’ the EU in its 
mission to protect human rights.12 
However, the existence of these parallel systems has presented 
two main difficulties: firstly, the fact that EU law has not been 
legally bound by the ECHR means that conflicting requirements 
could be placed on Member States, whereby they would have to 
choose between breaching their obligations under EU law or 
violating the ECHR. Secondly, there has always been a tension 
between the EU’s deference to the ECHR as an external source of 
authority on human rights and its determination that EU law should 
be wholly autonomous. The tension between integration and 
autonomy was at the heart of the ECtHR’s ruling in the case of 
Bosphorus, which is discussed in the next section, and continues to 
dominate the struggle for accession, which is discussed thereafter. 
Existing Tensions and the Case for Formal Integration 
In 1990, in the case of M & Co v Federal Republic of Germany, the 
ECtHR established the foundations for a doctrine of ‘equivalent 
protection’, whereby a Member State that has transferred certain 
powers to an international organisation is assumed to be acting in 
adherence with the ECHR so long as that organisation is considered 
to provide comparable protection.13 Such protection was deemed to 
be provided under EEC law due to the oversight of the ECJ.14 In 
Bosphorus the doctrine’s application to the EU was confirmed, but it 
was ruled that the presumption is rebuttable on a case-by-case 
basis.15 Member States therefore remain at risk of prosecution for 
                                                                                                                              
Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights 
Post Lisbon’ (July 2014) <https://dm.coe.int/CED20140017597> accessed 22 July 
2016, 36. 
12 Council of Europe, ‘Dialogue between Judges’ (2009) <http://echr.coe.int/ 
Documents/Dialogue_2009_ENG.pdf> accessed 25 September 2016. 
13 App no 13258/87 (1990) 64 DR 138. 
14 In Matthews v United Kingdom (1999) 28 EHRR 361, however, the ECtHR saw 
fit to review an EC law on the basis that it was beyond the mandate of the ECJ. 
15 (n 2). See also C Costello, ‘The Bosphorous Ruling of the European Court of 
Human Rights: Fundamental Rights and Blurred Boundaries in Europe’, 6(1) HRL 
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breaches of the ECHR that are directly and unavoidably caused by 
their implementation of EU law. 
The Bosphorus decision provides a clear example of the 
tensions that can emerge between overlapping rights regimes. The 
case concerned a decision by the Irish Ministry of Transportation to 
impound a plane that had been leased by the applicant company. 
The applicant company, based in Turkey, had leased the plane from 
a company in the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). In 
1993 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 820 
(1993), which provided that States should impound, inter alia, all 
aircraft in their territories ‘in which a majority or controlling interest 
is held by a person or undertaking in or operating from the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia’, in response to the extreme human rights 
violations that were being perpetrated in the area. That resolution 
was implemented by EU Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93, which came 
into force on 28 April 1993.  
The tension in this case came when the European Court of 
Justice and the European Court of Human Rights formed differing 
options on the same issues and facts. While the case was originally 
heard in the Irish High Court, the Irish Supreme Court referred the 
matter to the European Court of Justice. The ECJ found that Ireland 
had correctly implemented the EU Regulation relating to sanctions 
and that the decision to impound the plane was not disproportionate. 
Specifically, the European Court of Justice formed the opinion that:  
As compared with an objective of general interest so 
fundamental for the international community, which 
consists in putting an end to the state of war in the region 
and to the massive violations of human rights and 
humanitarian international law in the Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the impounding of the aircraft in question, 
which is owned by an undertaking based in or operating 
from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, cannot be 
regarded as inappropriate or disproportionate.16 
                                                                                                                              
Rev (2006) 87; J Callewaert, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and 
European Union Law: A long way to harmony’ (2009) 6 EHRL Rev 768, 773. 
16 Case C-84/95 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v Minister for 
Transport, Energy and Communications and others [1996] ECR I-03953, para 26. 
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The applicant company then brought the case to the European 
Court of Human Rights, which ruled in the company’s favour in 
June 2005. Throughout the entirety of the legal proceedings the 
applicant company maintained that there was no breach of sanctions: 
the applicant company was based in Turkey, had leased the plane 
prior to the sanctions coming into effect, had full rights of the use of 
the plane and was even depositing the lease payments to the 
Yugoslavian company into a frozen bank account in Turkey. The 
ECtHR confirmed that the applicant company had a right to conduct 
its business and had suffered significant finical losses due to the 
impounding of the plane.  
In the example of Bosphorus, then, the two courts came to 
different conclusions, even though they agreed on the facts of the 
case and both relied on well-established human rights principles in 
formulating their decisions. The opposing results were therefore due 
to differing interpretations of the issues at stake. While the ECJ 
prioritised the importance of maintaining a sanctions regime that 
was designed to impede a brutal civil war, the ECtHR focused on the 
disproportionate effects that the sanctions regime had inflicted on an 
innocent third party (the applicant company). 
To overcome this impasse, the ECtHR chose to invoke the 
doctrine of equivalent protection (which is now widely referred to as 
the ‘Bosphorus presumption’) in order to recognise that the state had 
acted in accordance with a legitimate general interest in its 
implementation of EU law. However, the presumption does not 
completely absolve EU Member States of their ECHR responsibilities, 
as it is dependent on the provision of adequate protection and is 
rebuttable in cases of ‘manifest deficiency’.17 Thus, 
If such equivalent protection is considered to be provided 
by the organisation, the presumption will be that a State 
has not departed from the requirements of the Convention 
when it does no more than implement legal obligations 
flowing from its membership of the organisation. However, 
any such presumption can be rebutted if, in the 
                                                       
17 See Matthews (n 14). 
Birkbeck Law Review Volume 4(1) 
 8 
circumstances of a particular case, it is considered that the 
protection of Convention rights was manifestly deficient.18 
What the ECtHR created, then, was a potential justification 
for EU Member States whose actions might otherwise have been 
found to have breached the ECHR. This was controversial due to the 
‘two-tier’ human rights system that this was deemed to create, where 
the ECtHR would apply different standards to EU and non-EU 
Member States. This issue was assuaged by the prospect that the 
presumption could be rebutted, but this perpetuated the risk that EU 
Member States could face contradictory obligations, which would 
cause the credibility of both the CJEU and the ECtHR as human 
rights authorities to be compromised.19 
Article 6(2) of the Treaty of Lisbon sought to resolve this issue 
by stating that the EU shall accede to the ECHR, as this would 
‘complete’ the coverage of ECHR protection and thereby release 
Member States from the possibility of conflicting obligations. Here, 
however, a further challenge arises through the concern that all 
parties to the ECHR should be treated equally. This would most 
likely require the presumption of equivalent protection – even as 
modified by Bosphorus – to be revoked in order to allow for 
meaningful judicial review by the ECtHR.20 Almost seven years later, 
though, the question of how to accede while meeting the 
requirements of both the EU and the CoE institutions remains an 
unsolved riddle. 
The Current Situation and the Path Ahead 
From the outset, it was recognised that the accession of the EU to the 
ECHR was both technically and politically ambitious: technically 
because of the intricacies of EU law, and politically because of the 
number of national and international institutions whose input and 
agreement would be required to achieve such a monumental 
recalibration of the European legal order. In 2012, Protocol 8 to the 
                                                       
18 Bosphorus (n 2) para 156. 
19 Costello (n 15) 88-9. 
20 Morano-Foadi and Andreadakis (n 11) 53-5. 
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Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union established some 
key prerequisites to the Article 6(2) declaration that the EU shall 
accede to the ECHR. In particular, Protocol 8 specifies that an 
accession agreement should ‘make provision for preserving the 
specific characteristics of the Union and Union law’ and should ‘not 
affect the competences of the Union or the powers of its 
institutions’.21 
Subsequently, the Draft Accession Agreement (DAA) is one of 
several documents seeking to establish the terms and conditions by 
which the EU would accede to the ECHR, which have been compiled 
by negotiators from the EU and from each of the CoE’s 47 Member 
States.22 The DAA aims to provide for the Protocol 8 prerequisites 
and to resolve several complex issues, including: ensuring that the 
EU will be treated on an equal footing to other contracting parties; 
determining the participation of the EU in ECHR institutions and 
budgets; safeguarding the exclusive authority of the CJEU to 
interpret EU law and resolve disputes within its domain; ensuring 
that the division of competences between the EU and its member 
states is not affected by accession; and ensuring that the position of 
member states under the ECHR (with respect to any reservations 
they may have made) is not affected by the accession. 
In June 2014, Advocate General Kokott from the CJEU 
delivered an Opinion on the DAA in which she highlighted several 
difficulties but concluded overall that the DAA was compatible with 
EU law. 23  Therefore, the publication of the CJEU’s contrasting 
finding six months later was a considerable shock to all those 
involved. Whereas Kokott had identified specific areas where some 
further provisions were required to fully safeguard the autonomy of 
EU law and to resolve certain procedural questions, the CJEU’s 
Opinion 2/13 was less positive in tone. Opinion 2/13 picked up on 
                                                       
21 Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 8 Relating to Article 6(2) of the Treaty on 
European Union on the Accession of the Union to the European Convention on the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
22 ‘Draft Revised Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ 
(Strasbourg, 10 June 2013) <https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/ 
Accession/Meeting_reports/47_1(2013)008rev2_EN.pdp> accessed 22 July 2016. 
23 View of AG Kokott relating to Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2475. 
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several of the points noted by Kokott but found them to be more 
substantial obstacles, as well as adding some new objections.24 The 
main areas in which non-compliance was found by the CJEU 
pertained to the autonomy of EU law,25 the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the CJEU, the co-respondent mechanism (through which a case may 
be brought against both a Member State and the EU), and 
jurisdiction regarding the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy.26 
Resolving the issues identified by Opinion 2/13 would require 
restarting negotiations between the EU and the CoE to amend the 
DAA. Additional declarations and/or memoranda of understanding 
might also need to be drafted, and it may even be necessary to 
propose further amendments to the ECHR and/or to the EU 
treaties. 27  Such additional amendments are likely to present 
considerable delays to the accession process, as any amendment to 
the ECHR will require the consent of the 47 CoE Member States, 
and, correspondingly, any amendment to the EU treaties will require 
the consent of the 28 EU Member States. Successful accession will 
therefore require a lot of patience and determination from all those 
involved, but the final arrangement should create a robust human 
rights regime across Europe as a result. 
The Status of Human Rights Protections in Europe:  
a Conversation with Dr Sonia Morano-Foadi 
JN: It’s been over a year since the CJEU published Opinion 2/13; 
what was the initial reaction to the Opinion and how has this 
changed? 
                                                       
24 Opinion 2/13 (n 1). 
25 See D Halberstam, ‘It's the Autonomy, Stupid!’ A Modest Defense of Opinion 
2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR, and the Way Forward’ (2015) 16 German 
Law Journal 105; E Lentsch, ‘From Informal to Institutionalised Dialogue between 
the CJEU and the ECtHR: The Tightrope Walk between the EU’s Autonomy and 
the Coherence of Fundamental Rights Protection in Europe’ (Jean Monet Working 
Paper 12/2016) <http://www.ceje.ch/files/6514/6486/9034/Geneva_JMWP_12-
Lentsch.pdf> accessed 25 September 2016. 
26 Morano-Foadi and Andreadakis (n 11). 
27 ibid. 
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SM-F: We did not anticipate such an outcome: Opinion 2/13 sent 
shockwaves through both the EU and the Council of Europe, as well 
as legal and academic communities around the world. An 
atmosphere of disappointment and pessimism was created across the 
European continent. Today, 16 months later, things look more stable 
as disappointment has been replaced by reflection and distress has 
become pragmatism. 
JN: I understand that your earlier research anticipated that the 
principle of autonomy would be central to Opinion 2/13; why is 
autonomy such a pivotal issue in the accession negotiations? 
SM-F: The CJEU has emphasised in strong terms that the EU is a 
unique legal order with its own constitutional framework, founding 
principles, institutional structure and full set of legal rules. This 
peculiarity has consequences for the procedure and conditions of 
accession to the ECHR. The CJEU Opinion took a very strict 
approach to the accession prerequisites laid down in the Treaties and 
in Protocol 8, especially in relation to the notion of autonomy. The 
origins of the EU concept of autonomy can be traced back to the 
case of Costa v ENEL,28 the seminal decision through which the 
Court finished the job it had started in Van Gend & Loos,29 where it 
had proclaimed that primary law could have direct effect in Member 
States’ legal orders. The CJEU reasoned that direct effect meant little 
if national norms could later set aside integrated European law. 
Therefore, the need for a rule that ensured the primacy of European 
law over national law was established, and it was for this purpose 
that the concept of autonomy was developed.  
While placing the fundamental rights recognised by the 
Charter at the heart of the EU legal structure, the CJEU emphasised 
in Opinion 2/13 that the autonomy enjoyed by EU law in relation to 
the laws of the Member States and in relation to international law 
requires the interpretation of fundamental rights to be guaranteed 
within the framework of the structure and objectives of the EU. One 
point of contention here is the principle of mutual trust between EU 
Member States, which could affect the autonomy of EU law if it 
                                                       
28 Costa (n 9). 
29 Case 26/62 Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v 
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1. 
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were to be interpreted in a manner that is inconsistent with this 
autonomous legal system. The principle of mutual trust allows each 
Member State, save in ‘exceptional circumstances’, to assume that all 
other Member States are in compliance with EU law, especially 
regarding EU fundamental rights. Although such a presumption can 
be rebutted on grounds of public policy or in certain breaches of 
fundamental rights, it is potentially problematic, particularly with 
regard to the area of freedom, security and justice. The CJEU has 
acknowledged the necessity of allowing exceptions to mutual trust 
between EU Member States when, for example, the (absolute) 
protection from refoulement under Article 4 of the Charter is at 
stake. The Court set a high threshold to ‘rebut trust’ by establishing 
the criterion of ‘systemic deficiencies’, even though in the recent 
joined cases of Pál Aranyosi and Robert C!ld!raru v 
Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Bremen a more flexible approach 
emerged.30 The principle of mutual trust is just one facet of the issue 
of autonomy which illuminates just how complex the issue is, 
making it extremely difficult to draft an accession agreement that 
fully respects the Protocol 8 prerequisites. 
JN: The issue of sovereignty is one that has been raised in both the 
Brexit campaign and arguments for the UK to distance itself from the 
ECHR (through the repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the 
introduction of a ‘British Bill of Rights’); how do these concerns over 
sovereignty connect with or compare to the EU’s concern over 
autonomy?  
SM-F: The issue of sovereignty used in the Brexit campaign relates to 
competence and to the transfer of powers from the UK, as a Member 
State, to the EU. However, arguments referring to sovereignty have 
been based on false assumptions that entire areas of law are now 
dealt with by the EU alone in its exclusive capacity as legislator. The 
reality is different as the EU only has exclusive competence in limited 
areas such as the customs union, the monetary policy and the 
common commercial policy. The rest is either within the competence 
of the Member State or is shared between the Member States and the 
EU. 
                                                       
30 Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15, Pál Aranyosi and Robert C!ld!raru v 
Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Bremen [2016] OJ C 59. 
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In contrast, EU autonomy means that the EU legal order is 
different from the national or the international legal system, with its 
own structure, principles and values that if not respected will 
undermine the whole internal market project. 
JN: What impact do you think that Brexit could have on the project 
of harmonising European human rights protections?  
SM-F: If/when the UK leaves the EU, the whole EU project will be 
slowed down and a chain reaction might occur with other states 
leaving. This will occur in the short term. In the long term, I feel that 
the remaining countries of the EU could proceed towards a more 
integrated Europe, achieving a stronger Union and, subsequently, a 
more robust standard of human rights protections.  
JN: Ultimately, do you think that the accession of the EU to the 
ECHR will simplify or further complicate the provision of human 
rights protections to citizens? Will it have a significant effect on 
human rights protections, or is the accession mostly a bureaucratic 
exercise?  
SM-F: I guess it will be good. Not easy, but a sign of an increased 
understanding that protection of human rights is the route we should 
follow. At the end of the day, EU accession to the ECHR will be 
mainly advantageous to Member States, as citizens under the current 
system can bring a claim involving an EU regulation implemented at 
the national level to the ECHR and the State might be condemned 
even if it had no discretion in its implementation. 
JN: How is the relationship between the two European courts, the 
CJEU and the ECtHR, after Opinion 2/13? Do you think that 
accession will still happen? 
SM-F: Following further empirical work done with CJEU judges my 
colleagues and I believe the relationship is good and has been 
strengthened by an exchange of personnel/judges between the two 
courts which occurred recently. For example, the new Irish judge in 
the Strasbourg Court, Siofra O’Leary, was previously working as a 
referedaire with Judge O’Keeffe at the CJEU. She masters EU law 
very well and it is extremely positive to have someone at the ECHR 
with a strong experience of EU law. At the same time, Dean 
Spielman , the former president of the ECtHR, is now an additional 
judge at the General Court of the CJEU.  
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I believe that accession is still possible, but it will require a 
considerable amount of time and effort before it becomes reality. 
Amendments to the DAA are inevitable if accession is to progress 
and be achieved, and this brings challenges related to reopening the 
DAA to negotiation. 
JN: The accession can be seen as a logical step towards harmonising 
human rights protections across Europe. What might be the next 
step towards this goal? What might the achievement of complete 
harmonisation look like and is such a thing possible? 
SM-F: In an ideal world I would suggest a unique system of human 
rights protection which could bring together the EU and the CoE, as 
in my view a historical error happened at the time of the inception of 
both entities. It was not foreseen how the two entities would evolve 
and that economic integration could not occur separately from 
human rights provisions. And so it would be beneficial to construct a 
unified human rights framework for Europe that was not 
constrained by the political and bureaucratic legacies of either 
organisation. More realistically, though, it is very difficult to predict 
how the harmonisation project will progress, especially in the current 
political climate. Two parallel processes are operating at all levels in 
Europe. The first is characterised by disintegration forces affecting 
both the European architecture and the concept of the nation-state. 
The second, which is less visible, is characterised by an emerging will 
of integration, inclusion and social justice. This originates at the 
grassroots level and could have important transformative effects on 
human rights protections across Europe. 
